

CORRUPTION CRIMES AND THE ECONOMY CENTRAL SULAWESI PROVINCE

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Abstract: This study aims to determine the amount of state losses as a result of corruption in Central Sulawesi Province, to determine the perception index of corruption crimes in Central Sulawesi Province, to determine the effects of corruption on the economy of Central Sulawesi Province, and to determine the causes of corruption crimes in Central Sulawesi Province. The data analysis method used descriptive statistical techniques, namely the Corruption Perception Index analysis. The results of the study indicate that public services at Regional Apparatus Organizations (OPD) in Central Sulawesi Province are perceived by the public to be Clean From Corruption. Thus, officers have provided public services to the community in a good, transparent, clean and accountable manner. This is indicated by the results of a survey on perceptions of corruption in public services at Regional Apparatus Organizations (OPD) in Central Sulawesi Province, which obtained a Corruption Perception Index value of 3.31 or categorized as Clean From Corruption (range 3.25 – 4.00). From the Corruption Perception Index (GPA) obtained by 82.77 or the corruption perception value of the Public Service Unit in Regional Apparatus Organizations (OPD) in Central Sulawesi Province, it is perceived as Clean From Corruption by the user community (the range of Clean From Corruption is 81.26 - 100.00).

Keywords: Corruption Crime and the Economy of Central Sulawesi

A. INTRODUCTION

Indonesia is one of the richest countries in Asia in terms of its diverse natural resources. But ironically, this beloved country compared to other countries in the Asian region is not a rich country but a poor country. Why is this so? One of the reasons is the low quality of its human resources. This quality is not only in terms of knowledge or intellect but also involves the quality of morals and personality. The moral fragility and low level of honesty of state officials have led to corruption. Corruption in Indonesia today is a very dangerous social pathology (social disease) that can threaten all aspects of the life of society, nation and state. Corruption has resulted in huge material losses of state finances (Astuti & Chariri, 2015: 8). However, what is even more concerning is the seizure and depletion of state finances carried out collectively by members of the legislature under the pretext of comparative studies, THR, severance pay and so on beyond reasonable limits because corruption is very detrimental to state finances and is carried out en masse. Such forms of deprivation and drain of state finances occur in almost all regions of the country. This is a reflection of the lack of morality and shame, so that what stands out is the attitude of greed and luck.

Corruption is an extraordinary crime. In general, corruption has been understood as an abuse of power that has been entrusted to someone to reap personal and group benefits. Corruption has eroded trust, weakened democracy, hindered economic development and exacerbated inequality, poverty and environmental crises.

Corruption is one of the prohibited acts in Indonesia because it is a criminal offence. This is stated in the Law of the Republic of Indonesia Number 28 of 1999 concerning the Implementation of a State that is Clean and Free from Corruption, Collusion and Nepotism article 1 paragraph 3 which reads, corruption is a criminal offence as

referred to in the provisions of laws and regulations governing criminal acts of corruption.

Juridically based on Article 3 of Law of the Republic of Indonesia Number 31 of 1999 concerning the Eradication of the Crime of Corruption states: Every person who is categorised as unlawful, commits an act to enrich himself/herself, benefit himself/herself or another person or a corporation, abuses the authority or opportunity or means available to him/her because of his/her position or position that may harm the state finances or the state economy. In the Law of the Republic of Indonesia Number 31 of 1999 in conjunction with Law No. 20 of 2001 concerning the Eradication of Corruption, acts of corruption include: (1) harming state finances by unlawful means or abuse of authority; (2) bribery; (3) embezzlement in office; (4) extortion; (5) fraudulent acts; (6) conflict of interest in circumstances; (7) gratification (gift giving). According to Transparency International, corruption is the behaviour of public officials, politicians, civil servants, who improperly / illegally enrich themselves or enrich those close to them by abusing entrusted public power (Kuncoro, 2013).

Corruption is a bureaucratic disease that hampers the service process in the life of the nation. This greatly hampers the process and results of national development. Marwata said that Indonesia's Corruption Perception Index (CPI) is 40 on a scale of 0-100. For the scope of ASEAN countries, Indonesia is below Singapore and Malaysia. This means that the gap with other countries is still far away; other countries have an average score of 90 (Haryanto, 2020: 1). Based on data released by Transparency International in the Corruption Perception Index, Indonesia has a score of 37 on a scale of 100 and ranks 102 out of 180 countries.

The Corruption Perception Index (CPI) is an aggregate indicator that combines various sources of information about corruption, making it possible to compare the level of corruption of each country. GPA data acquisition uses a scale from 0-100. If a country's GPA score is close to "0" then the level of corruption in the country is very high and vice versa, if a country's GPA score is close to "100" then the country has a low level of corruption or in other words is free from corruption. Despite the various weaknesses of the measurement system, the published GPA rankings and scores have succeeded in triggering countries with the lowest GPA rankings to seriously address and fight corruption in their countries.

Corruption for profit is done in several ways, such as accepting bribes, gratuities, or kickbacks from corporate contract tenders. State budgets and revenues are absorbed and obtained by corporations, while licensing, programmes, and contract tenders, authority is obtained from state officials, so corruption is the fruit of cooperation between state officials and corporations. Authority that turns into arbitrariness is the forerunner of corruption.

Corruption is a bad act (such as embezzlement, accepting bribes and so on). Corruption is extremely harmful to human life, in terms of social, political, bureaucratic, economic and individual aspects of life. Regional autonomy is regarded by the government as an antidote to regional political turmoil. This policy was promised as a polar opposite to the centralised political system and financial structure that had been implemented previously. However, what happened was that this hope led to a shift in corruption from the central level to the regional level, which had an economic effect on improving the welfare of the people in the regions. Such as the emergence of new modes of corruption crimes, either by manipulating regional expenditure or illegally cutting regional income.

These cases are considered by The Habibie Centre's researcher, Andrinof A. Chaniago, to be the result of increased legislative and executive power in the regions. This is possible because in Law No. 22/1999 on Local Government, council members have great rights to regulate the budget. However, on the other hand, the law does not regulate the issue of transparent accountability mechanisms to the public. It is not surprising that this great authority has led to irregularities, namely channeling state funds into personal pockets. Worse, the efforts to enrich themselves are carried out en masse, so that they are heavy on rights, weak on obligations (Source: The Habibie Centre, 2004).

The lack of transparency and accountability in the preparation of the APBD is a potential entry point for the legislature (board members) to cause irregularities in the implementation of the budgeting function. Fund allocation plans in the APBD that reflect regional policies are often prepared in a less transparent manner and do not involve public participation, so that they often cause public protests. This is due to the absence of a regional accounting system and the fact that APBDs have not been prepared based on performance budgets as stipulated in PP No 105 of 2000. If this continues, then the possibility of opportunities for corruption in every financial line

becomes greater. According to the author, this can be the main trigger for corrupt behaviour, because the capability to carry out a good regional accounting system will result in confusion in the regional accounting system.

Basically, corruption at the regional level is a form of sweet cooperation between political power in the region, with certain interest groups, resulting in regional corruptors who are dictators. This is corruption by design, because 75 per cent of local regulations (Perda) that are born to increase local revenue are actually full of corruption. For this reason, in addition to including administrative procedures in the accountability of Council members, there also needs to be political procedures that involve the community in overseeing the implementation of the APBD. For example, with open meetings or regular reports to the public through the mass media.

Although corruption cases by the legislature in the regions have decreased due to the aggressiveness of law enforcement and system changes that limit the legislative control function, discretion in the executive seems to restore the authority of regional heads to do many things, encouraging abuse of authority that nourishes corruption. According to the Ministry of Home Affairs' records, until the end of April 2020 there were 173 regional heads from 524 autonomous regions involved in corruption (Source: Jawa Pos, 16 April 2020). Of this number, 70% have been convicted by the court. This means that 1/3 of the total regional heads are suspected of harming the state, enriching themselves or others intentionally or not.

The number of reports on corruption cases alone until early July 2020 reached 3,423 cases. If averaged, each regional head contributes to approximately 20 corruption cases. The entanglement of the problem, 85 per cent revolves around cases of procurement of goods and services. If the loopholes of corruption revolve around four main problems other than procurement tenders, it can be assumed that the remaining 15 per cent are related to the use of vague APBD / APBN, manipulation of licensing at the central and regional levels, and the excesses of regional elections that result in the disbursement of money in the form of money politics (Source: Republika, 13 June 2020).

When compared to the previous year, until June 2019, symptoms of growing corruption had actually been detected by PPATK, out of 2,258 financial transaction reports there were 1,153 suspicious transactions made by regional treasurers. The modus operandi was buying Bank Indonesia letters and depositing regional money. Besides regional treasurers, 376 regional heads and 339 other officials made suspicious transactions.

The data above shows that the movement of corruption has experienced a kind of shift as well as enlargement in certain entities. Horizontally at the centre, corruption experiences a cyclical transition in each branch of power, while vertically in the regions corruption experiences enlargement at the level of certain government entities where authority abounds due to system changes that provide a number of discretions. The crime of corrupt behaviour is prone to occur in the executive space that controls the bureaucracy as the main engine of the wheels of government in 4 (four) matters, namely the use of regional revenue and expenditure budgets (APBD), procurement of goods and services, business licensing, the influence of conflicts of interest of officials within the bureaucracy, as well as the excesses of regional election events that cause the cost of returning capital to increase.

The high level of corruption that occurs according to Rimawan (2012) is due to the fact that the maximum penalty for corruption offences actually stimulates potential perpetrators to calculate the level of corruption that is profitable. Over time, the deterrent effect of the maximum fine in the law, especially the law on corruption offences, has become weaker due to Indonesia's high inflation. Using the assumption that corruptors have the same characteristics as conventional criminals. Post-corruption activities, which are certainly inseparable from corruption itself, are not regulated in the anti-corruption law, which in essence, the anti-corruption law does not pay attention to the rationality of potential perpetrators of corruption.

The effect of corruption on the economic aspect is a problem that can hinder economic development in each region. Indonesia is very serious in considering the dangers of corruption to the economy by forming police institutions at the regional level that are able to prevent and control such corruption aimed at raising awareness of the adverse effects of corruption on economic growth. Economic growth in the region can be measured based on an increase or increase in the production of goods and services and can be measured based on Gross Regional Domestic Product (GRDP). Many factors influence economic growth. Some of them are investment, technology,

labour, and education (Sukirno, 2008). In some cases most researchers have not seen that economic growth can be affected by corruption.

Looking at the relationship between corruption and economic growth Huntington (2008), argues that corruption will increase economic growth by speeding up the bureaucracy so that problems in the bureaucracy are easier to solve using money than by following the existing bureaucracy. Another opinion comes from Blackburn, et al (2005: 1-7) that corruption disrupts economic activity by distorting the efficient allocation of resources in the economy.

Most economists view corruption as a major impediment to development. This is inseparable from the increasing number of empirical studies showing that corruption has consequences that can reduce the level of investment, reduce the productivity of public spending, distort the allocation of resources and ultimately lead to inhibition of economic growth. In fact, the International Monetary Fund (2016) estimates that more than US\$ 1.5 - 2 trillion or about 2% of the world's total Gross Domestic Product (GDP) is lost annually due to corruption and bribery.

Although most empirical studies agree that corruption has a negative effect on economic growth, some other empirical studies show the opposite, stating that the negative effect of corruption on economic growth is not always confirmed and is even considered to have a positive effect. Wedema's (1997) research found that many countries enjoyed rapid economic growth despite facing high levels of corruption. Research by Acemoglu & Verdier (1998) using a theoretical model found that there is an optimal level of corruption when a country is pursuing the maximisation of national output. Similarly, research conducted by Colombatto (2003) also shows that corrupt practices in developing countries or totalitarian countries actually help in reducing certain factors that hinder economic development. Research by Barreto (2001) found that corruption has a significant positive relationship with GDP per capita growth using the same corruption indicators as research conducted by Mauro (1995). This statement is confirmed by Paksha Paul's research (2010) which found a positive relationship between corruption and economic growth in Bangladesh.

The existence of pro and con views on the crime of corruption in the economy is a research problem in this study. In Central Sulawesi Province itself, corruption cases handled by the Central Sulawesi Regional Police (POLDA) in this case DIT RESKRIMSUS POLDA Central Sulawesi is the settlement of Corruption Crime Cases (TPK) related to gratuities (bribery) of regional officials in the planning and management of regional budgets for the public interest sourced from the Regional Budget (APBD) and Regional Budget (APBN). The number of TPK Case Settlements handled by DIT RESKRIMSUS Central Sulawesi Police in April 2020 was 17 case reports, which increased in December to 19 case reports with state losses reaching Rp.8,473,751,333. Furthermore, in February 2021 the number of Corruption Crime Cases handled by DIT RESKRIMSUS Central Sulawesi Police was 8 case reports with the value of state losses reaching Rp.13,015,447,333.

This indicates that the corrupt behaviour of regional officials in the Central Sulawesi Province region is still relatively high, so according to researchers it is interesting to study when related to economic growth in the Central Sulawesi Province region. This is because the regional budget that is misappropriated is the budget sourced from the Regional Budget relating to capital expenditure and the State Budget relating to general assistance funds and special assistance funds from central government transfers intended for the public interest and is considered to have an influence on economic growth in the Central Sulawesi Province region.

This research is focused on identifying corruption crimes and the economy of Central Sulawesi Province. Based on the description above, the problem formulations in this study are:

1. What is the amount of state losses due to corruption crimes in Central Sulawesi Province?
2. What is the perception index of corruption crimes in Central Sulawesi Province?
3. What is the impact of corruption crimes on the economy of Central Sulawesi Province?
4. Why do corruption crimes occur in Central Sulawesi Province?

B. RESEARCH METHODS

To solve the research problem, the data that has been distributed and collected from research respondents is analysed using descriptive statistical techniques. Corruption crime perception data is measured using a rating scale

between 1-4. Where value 1 is the lowest perception score and value 4 is the highest perception score and reflects the quality of a clean and good bureaucracy in serving.

Corruption crime perception data is presented in the form of scoring / absolute numbers in order to know the increase / decrease in the corruption crime perception index of local officials for the services provided each year. The analysis technique for calculating the Corruption Crime Perception Index on the questionnaire is carried out in the following way:

1. Determine the total weight of each indicator used in this study.
2. Finding the average weight of each indicator. The index scale for each element ranges from 1-4 which is then converted to 25-100. The corruption crime perception index scale is between 1-4, which means that closer to a value of 4, the better the perception of corruption, the more CLEAN FROM CORRUPTION. The final result will give rise to a corruption crime perception index with reference to Table 1 Corruption Perception Score as follows:

Table 1. Corruption Perception Score

Perception Value	CPI Interval Value	CPI Conversion Interval Value	Quality of Service	Unit Performance
1	1,00 – 1,75	25,00 – 43,75	D	Not Clean From Corruption
2	1,76 – 2,50	43,76 – 62,50	C	Less Clean From Corruption
3	2,51 – 3,25	62,51 – 81,25	B	Fairly Clean From Corruption
4	3,26 – 4,00	81,26 – 100,00	A	Clean From Corruption

Respondents can fill out the e-survey on corruption perceptions of services either through a computer/laptop/smartphone. Before answering the e-survey, respondents must fill in personal data consisting of name, age, gender, latest education, and occupation. To find out the level of GPA, respondents are expected to provide an objective assessment of the various indicators in the e-survey. The indicators are as follows:

1. Service Procedure;
2. Officer behaviour outside the established procedures;
3. Money/goods reward
4. Brokering/middleman practices;
5. Discriminatory behaviour;
6. Illegal levies;
7. Discrimination in handling complaints;
8. Gifts;
9. Request for money/goods in return;
10. Service products.

C. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

1. Results

1.1. Respondent Profile

The number of respondents to the Corruption Perception Index (CPI) survey of Regional Apparatus Organisation (OPD) services in Central Sulawesi Province reached 120 respondents consisting of:

1) Gender

Respondent data based on gender based on the results of data collection can be seen in Table 2 below:

Table 2. Respondent Data Based on Gender

No.	Gender	Number of Respondents	Percentage (%)
1.	Men	72	60,00
2.	Woman	48	40,00
Total		120	100,00

Source: Primary Data, processed 2022.

Table 2 above shows that respondents receiving public services at the Regional Apparatus Organisation (OPD) in Central Sulawesi Province, who are male as many as 72 people or 60 percent and female as many as 48 people or 40 percent.

2) Last Education

Respondent data based on the latest level of education owned by respondents can be seen in Table 3 below:

Table 3. Respondent Data Based on Last Education

No	Last Education	Number of Respondents	Percentage (%)
1.	High School and below	34	28,33
2.	D1-D3	3	2,50
3.	S1-S3	83	69,17
Total		120	100,00

Source: Primary Data, processed 2022.

An overview of the condition of respondents based on the latest education level in Table 3 above, shows that respondents with S1-S3 education levels are the most respondents, namely 83 respondents or 69.17 per cent, while the D1-D3 education level is 3 respondents or 2.50 per cent. This indicates that most respondents receiving public services at the Regional Apparatus Organisation (OPD) in Central Sulawesi Province have a high education.

3) Work

Data on respondents based on their occupation can be seen in Table 4 below:

Table 4 Respondent Data Based on Occupation

No	Work	Number of Respondents	Percentage (%)
1.	Self-employed	50	41,67
2.	CIVIL SERVANT / ARMY / POLICE	30	25,00
3.	Private	24	20,00
4.	More	16	13,33
Total		120	100,00

Source: Primary Data, processed 2022.

Table 4 above shows that the majority of respondents receiving public services at the Regional Apparatus Organization (OPD) in Central Sulawesi Province have jobs as entrepreneurs, namely 50 respondents or 41.67 percent and the minority of respondents have other jobs, namely 16 people or 13.33 percent. This indicates that the self-employed are the respondents who most often receive public services at the Regional Apparatus Organisation (OPD) in Central Sulawesi Province. Generally, entrepreneurs deal with OPDs to take care of various forms of public services related to the businesses they manage.

1.2. Descriptive Analysis of Frequency Distribution of Research Variables

After all the data from the respondents' responses are collected and no defective data is found, the next step is to tabulate the data to make the level of respondents' responses regarding the Corruption Perception Index (CPI) instrument per indicator where each statement item is 1 to 4 which is then converted to a number 25-100, which is tested on 0 respondents.

The basis for interpreting the average weighted value of the Corruption Perception Index of each public service indicator in the Regional Apparatus Organisation (OPD) in Central Sulawesi Province refers to Table 5 as follows:

Table 5. Basis for Interpretation of Corruption Perception Value of Each Indicator Public Service

Perception Value	CPI Value	Interval	CPI Conversion Interval Value	Quality Service	of Service Unit Performance
1	1,00 – 1,75		25,00 – 43,75	D	Not Clean From Corruption
2	1,76 – 2,50		43,76 – 62,50	C	Less Clean From Corruption
3	2,51 – 3,25		62,51 – 81,25	B	Fairly Clean From Corruption
4	3,26 – 4,00		81,26 – 100,00	A	Clean From Corruption

To determine the level of the Corruption Perception Index (CPI), the assessment of 120 respondents on various indicators of public services in Regional Apparatus Organisations (OPD) in Central Sulawesi Province will be described, with the following description:

1) Analysis of Respondents' Responses to Service Procedures

According to the results of the assessment of 120 research respondents, the Service Procedures established at the Regional Apparatus Organisation (OPD) in Central Sulawesi Province are adequate and do not have the potential to cause corruption, collusion and nepotism (KKN), with the results of the assessment distribution shown in diagram 1 below:




Figure 1. Frequency Distribution of Respondents' Responses Indicators of Service Procedures

The results of respondents' perceptions that the established service procedures are adequate and do not have the potential to cause KKN are indicated by the results on the index reaching a value of 3.17, which is in the category of being quite Clean From Corruption.

2) Analysis of Respondents' Responses to Officer behaviour outside established procedures

According to the results of the assessment of 120 research respondents, service officers did not provide services outside the established procedures, with the results of the assessment distribution shown in diagram 2 below:




Figure 2. Frequency Distribution of Respondents' Responses to Indicators Officer behaviour outside of established procedures

The results of respondents' perceptions that the behaviour of service officers does not provide services outside the established procedures by showing the results on the index reached 2.98. The index can be interpreted that the behavioural performance of service officers is quite clean from wrong actions by not providing services outside the procedure.

3) Analysis of Respondents' Responses to Money / Goods Rewards

According to the results of the assessment of 120 research respondents, service officers did not ask for compensation for goods / services for services provided by Regional Apparatus Organisations (OPD) in Central Sulawesi Province, with the results of the assessment distribution shown in diagram 3 below:




Figure 3. Frequency Distribution of Respondents' Responses to Indicators of Money / Goods Rewards

The results of respondents' perceptions that services are clean from the practice of requesting and receiving money/goods in return. This is indicated by the results on the index reaching 3.33.

4) Analysis of Respondents' Responses to Brokering/Brokerage Practices

According to the results of the assessment of 120 research respondents, there is no practice of brokering or unofficial intermediaries in the public services of Regional Apparatus Organisations (OPD) in Central Sulawesi Province, with the results of the distribution of assessments shown in diagram 4 below:




Figure 4. Frequency Distribution of Respondents' Responses to Indicators Brokering / intermediary practices

The results of respondents' perceptions that service officers are clean from brokering/brokerage practices. This is indicated by the results on the index reaching 3.36.

5) Analysis of Respondents' Responses to Discriminatory Behaviour

According to the results of the assessment of 120 research respondents, service officers are fair and non-discriminatory, with the results of the assessment distribution shown in diagram 5 below:




Figure 5. Frequency Distribution of Respondents' Responses to Indicators of Discriminatory Behaviour

The results of respondents' perceptions that services are free from discriminatory behaviour. This is indicated by the results on the index reaching 3.41.

6) Analysis of Respondents' Responses to Illegal Charges

According to the results of the assessment of 120 research respondents, there are no illegal levies, with the results of the distribution of assessments shown in diagram 6 below:




Figure 6. Frequency Distribution of Respondents' Responses to Indicator of Illegal Levy

The results of respondents' perceptions that services are clean from illegal levies. This is indicated by the results on the index reaching 3.49.

7) Analysis of Respondents' Responses to Discrimination in handling complaints

According to the assessment results from 120 respondents, there is no discrimination in handling service complaints, with the results of the assessment distribution shown in diagram 7 below:




Figure 7. Frequency Distribution of Respondents' Responses to Indicators of Discrimination in handling complaints

The results of respondents' perceptions of service products do not indicate discrimination in handling service complaints as indicated by the index results reaching 3.31.

8) Analysis of Respondents' Responses to Gifts

According to the results of the assessment of 120 respondents, service officers refused to give money/goods related to the services provided, with the distribution of assessments shown in diagram 8 below:




Figure 8. Frequency Distribution of Respondents' Responses to Gift Indicator

The results of respondents' perceptions that services are clean from corrupt practices by refusing gifts are shown by the results on the index reaching 3.33.

9) Analysis of Respondents' Responses to Requests for money/goods rewards

According to the results of the assessment of 120 respondents, service officers did not ask / demand money / goods in exchange for services provided, with the distribution of assessments in the following diagram 9:



Figure 9. Frequency Distribution of Respondents' Responses to Indicator Request for money/goods reward

The results of respondents' perceptions that service officers do not ask for money/goods in exchange for the services provided. This is indicated by the results on the index reaching 3.40.

10) Analysis of Respondents' Responses to Service Products

According to the results of the assessment of 120 research respondents, the products/services received are in accordance with the list of products/services available at the Regional Apparatus Organisation (OPD) in Central Sulawesi Province, with the results of the assessment distribution shown in diagram 10 below:




Figure 10. Frequency Distribution of Respondents' Responses to Service product indicators

The results of respondents' perceptions of service products at OPDs in Central Sulawesi Province are in accordance with the list of available service products as indicated by the results on the index reaching 3.33.

2. Discussion

The E-survey distributed to 120 respondents can be filled in properly so that it can be processed and analysed further. The Corruption Perception Index is the result of a quantitative survey of stakeholders related to a government agency. The GPA index has a scale between 0 which means very corrupt to 100 which means very clean. The index measures perceptions of the level of corruption in the public sector (especially government agencies), which in this case is the Public Service at the Regional Apparatus Organisation (OPD) in Central Sulawesi Province. The IPK index is a commitment that refers to the Minister of PAN and RB Regulation Number 52 of 2014 concerning Guidelines for the Development of Integrity Zones (ZI) Towards Areas Free from Corruption (WBK) and Clean and Serving Bureaucratic Areas (WBBM) within Government Agencies. Furthermore, the following average value per GPA indicator can be seen in Table 6 below.

Table 6. Total Average Value per Indicator of the Corruption Perception Indeks

No.	Indicators	CPI Interval Value	Quality of Service
1.	Service Procedure	3,00	B
2.	Officer behaviour outside of established	2,79	B

procedures			
3.	Money/goods reward	3,28	A
4.	Brokering/middleman practices	3,31	A
5.	Discriminatory behavior	3,39	A
6.	Illegal levies	3,43	A
7.	Discrimination in complaint handling	3,24	B
8.	Gifts	3,28	A
9.	Request for money/goods in return	3,33	A
10.	Service products	3,27	A

Source: Primary data, processed 2022.

The sum of the average corruption perception scores per indicator shows the public's assessment of the indicators of corruption elements in the service. The elements of service are in the average number of interval range 3.26 - 4.00 or service quality A (Clean From Corruption) and the average number of values in the interval range 2.51 - 3.25 or service quality B (Enough Clean From Corruption) so that when averaged service quality per service indicator is generally categorised as Clean From Corruption .

Based on Table 6, it can be seen that the majority of the 7 indicators have the highest average perception value with service quality A, while the lowest average perception value is the indicator of Officer Behaviour Outside the Established Procedure (2.79) which provides the lowest level of perception of corruption, which is quite Clean From Corruption compared to other indicators because it is still considered that the established service procedures are adequate and do not have the potential to cause KKN. The value of being quite Clean From Corruption is possible because respondents still do not understand the service procedures so as to minimise the potential for KKN because everything is done online. Therefore, it is necessary to carry out more intensive socialisation related to services to service users.

From the results of processing the filled questionnaires, the results show that the perceived value of corruption is " Clean From Corruption " by the user community. This can be seen from the GPA value obtained of 84.66 (the range of Clean From Corruption values is 81.26 - 100.00).

E. CONCLUSIONS

In general, the results of the corruption perception survey of Public Services in Regional Apparatus Organisations (OPD) in Central Sulawesi Province obtained a Corruption Perception Index value of 3.31 or in the category Of Clean From Corruption (range of values 3.25 - 4.00). Thus, officers in providing services have been carried out properly, transparently, cleanly and accountably.

1. Furthermore, the Corruption Perception Index (CPI) value obtained is 82.77 or the corruption perception value of the Public Service Unit at the Regional Apparatus Organisation (OPD) in Central Sulawesi Province is perceived as Clean From Corruption by the user community (the range Clean From Corruption values is 81.26 - 100.00).
2. The indicator that needs to be improved is the behaviour of officers outside the procedure who have a fairly clean description of corruption. Thus, in the future in the context of efforts to improve and improve the quality of service, all service procedures will be carried out more intense guidance to officers before carrying out services.

Recommendation

Based on the results of the CPI e-survey on services at Regional Apparatus Organisations (OPD) in Central Sulawesi Province, it is necessary to improve the behaviour of service officers in serving the community. In addition, it is necessary to improve clarity in service procedures so that the public understands and understands well the procedures for receiving services.

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