

Politicization of Anti-Corruption Campaign in Nigeria: The Case of Colonial Sokoto Emirate, 1903-1943

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IJMSSSR 2020

VOLUME 2

ISSUE 4 JULY – AUGUST

ISSN: 2582 - 0265

**Abstract:** In Nigeria, public sector corruption has been one of the most serious problems undermining the stability and progress of the nation for quite a long period of time. However, many efforts were exerted, strategies adopted, and programmes embarked upon towards curbing the menace by successive administrations in Nigeria. Yet, these graft agencies and programmes achieved very little, or indeed palpably failed in addressing the problem of corruption in the country. In fact, corruption is always taking new and magical dimensions, and the country's situation is degenerating from bad to worst. Well beyond the modern independent nation-state, this article seeks to examine how selfish collaboration between the native authority officials and British colonial officers did much in laying the foundation, or at least reviving and institutionalizing public sector corruption in Nigeria. The article examines how particularly the top native administration officials exploited the British zero tolerance on the misappropriation of taxation revenue to victimize and silenced their political opponents. Thus, it has been strongly argued that, lack of sincerity, godfatherism, and politicization of the anti-corruption agencies and programs, which are undermining and frustrating the anti-corruption campaigns and programs in Nigeria, thus institutionalizing corruption in the country, got much of its root during the colonial period. Many people with genuine corruption charges were spared for either simply belonging to the reigning native political camp, or for their perceived loyalty to British officers or the protectorate Government. Conversely, people with relatively minor charges or were entirely innocent, were sometimes trapped into false corruption charges, or stage-managed scenarios, simply to achieve political advantage. The article strongly posits that, the inability of the colonial establishments to initiate sincere and patriotic anti-corruption strategies, devoid of any personal or political aggrandizement, was responsible for their inability to fight corruption in the emirate.

**Keywords:** Politicization, Anti-Corruption, Campaign, Nigeria, Sokoto Emirate,

### Introduction

Corruption in Nigeria has actually eaten very deep in the social system. Not only has it penetrated the civil service; Federal, State and the Local Government, but also the courts, the dispensers of justice, as well. It had equally struck roots in the places, barracks, market palaces and even religious institutions. In fact, Universities which ought not only be centers of learning and moral excellence, but the rightful medium of addressing all social ills, have today in Nigeria become among the promoters of corruption. This happens, either through intellectual dishonesty by some of academic community through plagiarism and other related academic fraud, or rationalizing and idealizing these vices, particularly by writing colorful but concocted narratives, in the form of biographies or citations of corrupt political class, which, the management of most universities further legitimize, by conferring honorary titles, degrees, and fellowships.

Corruption in Africa, it is said was an unavoidable result of the cultural clash between traditional values and imported norms; a backlash of modernization and socio-political development. In Africa it developed into a practical problem involving the "outright theft, embezzlement of funds or other mis-appropriation of state property, nepotism and the granting of favours to personal acquaintances, and the abuse of public authority and position to exact payments and privileges.<sup>i</sup>

There can be no doubt that the problem of corruption is one of the most serious problems which the people of Nigeria have to tackle and overcome, if they are to make any significant and sustainable progress in the 21<sup>st</sup> century.

Having recognized the manumit of corruption in Nigeria with its devastating effects, successive administrations in the country adopted various measures, policies and programs, aimed at curbing the menace. In fact, military interventions in Nigerian politics used corruption and fight against it, as one of the reasons behind their take-over of power in virtually all the series of coups in Nigeria's political history. Moreover, most successive governments embarked upon different anti-corruption campaigns since the attainment of independence of the popular administrations, apart from the short-lived regime of late Murtala Muhammad, which forcefully attempted to tackle corruption, were Buhari/Idiagbon, Abacha and Chief Olusegun Obasanjo, regimes, respectively. The War against Indiscipline (WAI) of Buhari/Idiagbon regime is still remembered by many Nigerians. Similarly, the Abacha's War against Indiscipline and Corruption (WAIC) although not as successful as (WAI), equally aimed at addressing the problem of corruption in Nigeria. With the return of civilian administration in 1999, Chief Olusegun Obasanjo initiated on some measures and programmes aimed at tackling corruption in the country. The establishment of Independent Corrupt Practices and other Related Offences Commission (ICPC), and Economic and Financial Crime Commission (EFCC) were some of the bold steps taken towards eradicating corruption in Nigeria. But despite all these measures, strategies, and programs, the problem of corruption is not yet addressed.

Infact, the situation is always degenerating from bad to worst. Why the failure of all these programmes? In an attempt to provide the answer, this article identified the problem of politicization of anti-corruption campaign as the most fundamental factor responsible for the failure of Nigeria's anti-corruption campaign and programmes.

Far beyond the independent nation state, the article historically examines how collaboration between the native official and British colonial officers; as well as lack of sincerity, Godfatherism and overall politicization of the anti-corruption programs, not only frustrated the efforts at fighting corruption, but institutionalized it, in Nigeria. Ironically, the problem that have frustrated earlier efforts towards addressing corruption in Nigeria have not significantly change. This article therefore traces the genesis and dynamics of corruption in modern Nigeria with a view to unmasking where the problem actually lies.

### **The Concept of Corruption**

It is hardly the right place to indulge into an elaborate discussion on the concept of corruption. But only for the sake of working definition, the writer vent to concurring with Usman, who sees corruption, to means, much more than public officer taking bribes and gratification, committing fraud and stealing funds and assets entrusted to their care. Corruption in his view, means the deliberate violations for gainful ends, of standards of conduct legally, professionally, or, even ethically, established, in private and public affairs. These gains may be in cash, or, kind, or it may even be psychological, or, political, but they are made from the violation of the integrity of an entity and involves the subversion of its quality and capacity.<sup>ii</sup>

### **The British anti-Corruption Programs in Sokoto Emirate**

The British colonial administration aimed theoretically at eradicating all forms of vices, peculiar most particularly to primitive societies. Famine, diseases, misery of the slave trade, inter-tribal wars and oppressive regimes, among others.<sup>iii</sup> They equally intends to bring to the country all the gains of civilization, both in the development of resources and the wellbeing of the people.<sup>iv</sup>

Lugard categorically stated in his first and second speeches at Sokoto, after the defeat of the Caliphate forces, that their aim was to put an end to all form of mal-administration, autocratic, extortionate and oppressive regime, established by the Fulani, which, according to him, was the order of the day, as at the time of the British conquest.<sup>v</sup> Theoretically therefore, anti-corruption campaign, and the British conquest and colonization of Nigeria, were but facets of the same coin, from the narratives of British colonial officers.

Unfortunately, this noble theoretical aim of the colonial enterprise, and the machinery set to administer the Sokoto province were contradictory. One of such contradictions was that, the British, after the establishment of colonial administration, in their effort to administer the territories with the least expenditure possible, adopted various policies which facilitated the maximization of annual budgetary surpluses, which were expatriated to Britain.<sup>vi</sup> One of such policies was that the colonial administration only recognized the Emirs, District and Villages Heads, some N.A Officials and very few native police, as productive members of the native establishments. The

rest were regarded unproductive and thus not provided for, from the locally generated revenue. Instead, these officials were considered to be among the members of the Emir's, the District or even the Village head's households.<sup>vii</sup> The individual chiefs (District and Village Heads, particularly) were left to shoulder the responsibilities of the bunch of the so-called unproductive officials, who were ironically the ones assisting them in running the affairs of their domains. Ironically however, the colonial administration gave very small percentage of the locally generated revenue to the native chiefs. Consequently, not only were these officials involved in different corrupt practices in order to earn a living, but even the supposedly catered for, native chiefs, were thrown into gross maladministration and corrupt practices in order to meet the needs of the chunk of unpaid native officials, particularly the *Dogarai* (N.A. police) and other palace officials, despite their weak financial strength.<sup>viii</sup>

Strikingly, despite these contradictions which undoubtedly pushed many native chiefs into maladministration and thus hampered the British desire of fighting extortions, oppression, bribery and corruption as promised by Lugard. That despite the fact that the colonial administration vigorously pursued various strategies aimed at addressing corruption in Sokoto Emirate, the regime was not able to address the problem of corruption in the Emirate. Some of these anti-corruption strategies and programs initiated by the colonial administration involved various disciplinary actions in the form of warning, fine, suspension, removal, and, or imprisonment of affected officers. The British administration adopted zero tolerance on the misappropriation of the tax generated revenue. Administering serious disciplinary measures against native officials allegedly involved in different acts of corruption became a routine annual exercise in Sokoto Emirate. In 1939 alone, Resident Ross reported that more than 40 villages and districts heads were dismissed from office in Sokoto Emirate. Of these number, 25 among them were imprisoned in addition to dismissal from office.<sup>ix</sup> In fact, every year, some native chiefs and officials allegedly involved in corruption were severely dealt with. This situation continued up to the end of colonial administration.<sup>x</sup>

Reasons will suggest that with the continued witch-hunting, and, or administration of serious disciplinary measures against public office holders involved in different forms of corruption in Sokoto Emirate, the problem of corruption ought to have been remedied. Unfortunately, that did not happen. On the contrary, the problem persisted and kept on recurring throughout the colonial period, despite the disciplinary measures employed against some of the officers involved in corruption.

Why did all the strategies and programs employed to address the problem of corruption in colonial Sokoto Emirate failed? Although there were many factors responsible, particularly the earlier mentioned contradiction, of refusing to take care of many critical public officers, while still insisting on non-mismanagement of the tax generated revenue, but lack of sincerity from the leadership and the overall politicization of the anti-corruption programme was the most fundamental factor behind the failure of the British anti-corruption campaign in Sokoto emirate. An attempt has however been made to examine these issues in the remaining part of the article.

### **Understanding the Politics of Anti-Corruption Campaign in Colonial Sokoto Emirate, 1903-1943**

One of the earliest administrative policies initiated by the British colonial administration was that of strengthening the authority of the native chiefs, thus, giving those powers and instruments of implementing British orders, particularly the ones affecting the masses. Such as taxation and forced labor policies. According to Lugard;

If a native chief has lost prestige and influence to such a degree that he has to appeal to government to enforce his orders, he becomes not merely useless but a source of weakness to the administration.<sup>xi</sup>

The native chiefs were empowered with the police, courts and prisons and other instruments of coercing their subjects into which ever decision or action they desired. Eventually, the helpless peasants were subjected into extortionate practices and oppression by the native chiefs, under the guidance and supervision of British colonial officers. The British colonial officers collaborated with the native establishments and consented to their decisions and actions in dealing with the masses, as long as that could not jeopardize the mobilization and management of the tax generated revenue.<sup>xii</sup>

Another step taken by the British was to assist the Emirs silenced all their perceived threats and people who demonstrated some signs of disobedience. The *Sarakunan* (District Heads of) Yabo and Kaurar Namoda were

among the earliest native Chiefs reported to have demonstrate reluctance in fully submitting to Sultan Attahiru II, particularly in conscripting enough people to render forced labor from their Districts. Incidentally, they were systematically deposed on charges of corruption, disobedience and neglect of duty.<sup>xiii</sup> What was surprising was how they were trapped into corruption charges, instead of furnishing them on charges of disobedience if it actually exist. There were no genuine prove on the alleged corruption charges against them.

It is noteworthy to mention that colonial anti-corruption campaign in Sokoto Emirate was in the long-run manipulated and used merely as a political tool of silencing any perceived threat and political opponents. Native officials who were perceived to be threat or were in opposition with the reigning Emirs and some top N.A officials were seriously intimidated, coerced into forced submission, or silenced in the name of fighting corruption. Infact, there were instances, of plotting false corruption charges against political opponents, or sparing clients or collaborators against penalties after being proven guilty of corruption. One such earliest recorded example was the case of Sarkin Tambuwal Shehu. In 1907, Shehu was charged of different cases of oppression, extortion, corruption and mal-administration, and proven guilty by the native Alkali (Court). However, because of Shehu's relation with Resident Temple, the Resident directed the native Alkali to fine him one hundred and fifty pounds £150, which the Alkali did, instead of imprisoning, and, or, of deposing him, like what happened to Abdullahi, Sarkin Zamfaran Anka and some native officers charged with corruption.<sup>xiv</sup> But, Resident Temple insisted that Shehu should only be fined, and he thereafter personally assisted (Sarkin Tambuwal) Shehu with one hundred pounds £100 to enable him meet the fine.<sup>xv</sup> Lamenting on the Temple's concept of Justice, Tibenderana said:

But about the same time (Abdullahi was punished), Temple allowed Shefu, Sarkin Tambuwal, to remain in office after finding him guilty of several charges including oppression and extortion, for which he was fined £150..... There could possibly have been no greater miscarriage of Justice than this, and yet, Temple was never charged with corruption, a charge which would have been leveled against any Emir who acted as Temple did.<sup>xvi</sup>

It was evidently clear that Shehu was spared from diligent prosecution because of his patronage (*Daurin gindi*) with the British officers, particularly Resident Temple. Eventually, Shehu not only continue to disrespect the Sultan,<sup>xvii</sup> by refusing to carry out his instructions, but was probably the most autocratic ruler, ever, in the history of Tambuwal District. His memory is still fresh in the minds of many elderly people in Tambuwal.<sup>xviii</sup>

There were quite a number of similar episodes where some N.A officials will be punished on some corruption charges, but others with similar or even greater charges were allowed to go unpunished. In 1917, when the district head of Gusau, and the long disliked district head of Kotorkoshi, were trapped on corruption charges and deposed, the Sarkin Burni of Moriki could not be punished.<sup>xix</sup> The same thing happened to Magajin Gari, a more senior N.A official, and the Sultanate council member. He was deposed for his inability to account for some tax revenue. But although similar, or even greater financial misappropriation charges were proven against the district heads of Tambuwal and Rabah, none of them was punished.<sup>xx</sup> But interestingly however, when the successive district heads of Rabah and Tambuwal, together with some N.A officials, were hostile and at loggerhead with some British officers in 1922, they were deposed on alleged conspiracy and embezzlement.<sup>xxi</sup> All the proven corruption charges against the former District heads of Rabah and Tambuwal were not enough to cause their deposition, because of their friendship with some British officers. But their successors, who were not perceived friends, were immediately deposed on alleged charges without any diligence in proving the charges levelled against them. Another similar abuse of justice was the case of Sarkin Gobir of Kalgo in Gwandu emirate. He was found guilty of financial irregularities in 1941. But he was only transferred to Raha District.<sup>xxii</sup>

Another area of flagrant abuse of office during the British colonial administration of Sokoto Emirate was that appointments to public offices were mostly based on personal acquaintances and political interest, not on merit. Infact, many times British officers confess over the weaknesses of some princes and officials, but they still went ahead and entrusted position of authority on such individuals.<sup>xxiii</sup>

Similar interesting scenarios where anti-corruption campaign was deeply politicized, was in the succession struggles and, or, dynastic preservation drive in the Sokoto Emirate. On several occasions, reigning Emirs continue to witch-hunt, intimidate, and suppressed promising, princes who constituted or are capable of

constituting, threats, to a particular reigning Emir, or his dynasty. One such earliest recorded example was in 1910 during succession to the vizierate after the death of Wazir Muhammad Bukhari. Because of the intimate relation which existed between Late Wazir Muhammad Bukhari and Uthman Majidadi, Majidadi used his influence and relationship with both the Resident and the Sultan, to ensure the victory of Maccido, son of Muhammad Bukhari, against his uncle, Ambo. When, Ambo succeeded in the contest against the wish of Majidadi, he (Majidadi) and Shentali conspired against him and succeeded in achieving his downfall in 1912.<sup>xxiv</sup>

Another example worthy of note was the succession contest between Sultan Muhammad Tambari and Sultan Hassan Dan Mu'azu, in 1924. Although the Sokoto electoral council recommended Hassan against Tambari, the Colonial government turned it down in favour of Tambari. Thus, Tambari was appointed as the new Sultan, to succeed his late father, Muhammadu Mai-turare, in 1924. It was not only the appointment of Muhammadu Tambari against Hassan, despite the earlier doubt by the Resident on the intelligence and ability of Tambari, and more favorable commendation of Hassan, by Resident Webster that should engage someone's thought,<sup>xxv</sup> but the most surprising and interesting aspect of the whole episode was how corruption and financial charges were plotted against Hassan, and he was deposed from the district headship of Dange, notwithstanding his clean records before his contest to the Sultanate ship. Credible oral sources had it, that, after the succession struggle between Tambari and Hassan, in which Hassan gave Tambari serious contest, Tambari was determined to get rid of Hassan. Consequently, a notorious thief was used to steal that year's annual taxation funds from the District, which was under Hassan's custody, before taking it to the N.A Treasury at Sokoto. The tax money were stolen, and Hassan was subsequently accused of misappropriating the tax revenue. He was deposed and imprisoned, thus eliminating the perceived threat he constituted.<sup>xxvi</sup>

Interestingly also, Sultan Tambari was alleged to have masterminded the dismissal of all the senior N.A officials who do not supported his candidature in 1924. Some of the affected officials includes: Waziri Maccido; Uthman Majidadi, Uthman Magajin Gari, and Samaila, the Chief Alkali.<sup>xxvii</sup> Similarly, not only princes from the rival houses such as Hassan were intimidated or prosecuted, even within his own *Atikawa* ruling house, Tambari embarked on crushing all possible threats against the perpetuation of his dynasty. In 1930, he convicted his brother, Aliyu, then the district head of Bungudu on controversial corruption charges, and was deposed and imprisoned, while Tambari's son was placed in his position.<sup>xxviii</sup> Similarly, all the perceived supporters of Hassan, were gradually relieved off their positions. Consequently, the same factors which led to Tambari's accession, were to eventually lead to his downfall in 1931.<sup>xxix</sup>

Another interesting episode occurred in 1938, after the death of Sultan Hassan. The leading contenders were: Abubakar the Sardauna; Sarkin Gobir of Gwadabawa, (Abdul-Rahman); Sarkin Gobir of Isa; Sarkin Kudu of Sifawa, (Mamman); and Sarkin Rabah, Ahmadu.<sup>xxx</sup> The ex-school boys: Sarkin Rabah, Ahmadu; Sarkin Kudu Sifawa, Mamman; and Sarkin Gobir of Isa, Suleiman; were the most powerful contenders and clearly threatened the smooth succession of Abubakar, the Son (Nephew) to the deceased Sultan, Hassan. In the long run, Sardauna Abubakar, later Abubakar III, ascended the throne, against all odds. Sarkin Kudu Mamman was after some local politics promoted to Talatar Mafara, as District Head, while Ahmadu of Rabah was appointed as Sardauna, a senior counselor in the Sultanate council, the position occupied by Abubakar before his ascension to the Sultanate.<sup>xxxi</sup> But immediately when the Sultan (Abubakar) got himself consolidated on his throne, he turned against his political opponents. Sardauna Ahmadu was considered the most serious threat, particularly as a result of his closeness to the British officers, and his increasing popularity among the people. He was immediately posted to Gusau as the councilor representing the Sultan, in overseeing the administration of Gusau and eastern Zamfara districts.<sup>xxxii</sup> Even at Gusau, the Sardauna continue to constitute serious politics threat to the Sultan. Particularly because, his palace (house in Gusau) became a place of regular visit by ex-school boys, who were mostly his classmates, juniors, or Students. More also, Sardauna Ahmadu recorded a lot of Successes in the administration of Gusau, and in overseeing the eastern districts, particularly after the outbreak of the Second World War. He alone (Sardauna) was made to mobilize almost the whole quantity of grains, assigned to Sokoto Emirate, part of grains levy (requisition) to meet the British need, during the Second World War, from Gusau and the eastern districts. Despite the difficulty in exacting the required quantity of grains, as grains levy from peasant farmers in his domain, he was finally able to mobilize the tons assigned to him. Consequently, his ability, in addition to his education and charisma, further endeared him to the British officers. That in addition to his popularity among both Western educated elites and the masses of Sokoto, seriously became a source of concern to the reigning Sultan.<sup>xxxiii</sup> As a result of the perceived political threat constituted by the Sardauna, the Sokoto N.A decided to eliminate the threat by breaking or at least weakening Ahmadu's growing political cloud. Eventually, a

plot was constituted against him. He was charged of corruption and was finally sentenced to one year imprisonment.<sup>xxxiv</sup> His personal account of the episode reads as follows:

One afternoon a friend came to me in my house in Gusau and said, 'Look, a plot is being arranged against you, so that you will fall into un-escapable trap'. When I asked what sort of plot, he said that people were being organized to lay complaints against me so that I would be involve in a court case. I replied, *Tawakkaltu Alal Haiyil Larzi La'yamutu* (I depend on the soul that never dies). A week later, I heard that some Fulani (Nomadic cow-men) were being told to say that they paid cattle tax to me which never went into treasury. After necessary investigations by an instigated administrative officer who was specially sent for the purpose, I was summoned to appear before the sultan's court. I was tried and sentenced to one year imprisonment. Knowing my own reputation and standard and the way the case was tried, I appealed to the Supreme Court. The learned Judge (Mr. Ames), with two Muslim Jurists, allowed my appeal and I was therefore acquitted. My dependence on the soul that never dies proved right.<sup>xxxv</sup>

Similarly, Sarkin Kudun Sifawa Mamman was subsequently intimidated and subdued. For example, in a bid to weaken his political cloud, he was posted to Gusau, from his station at Mafara. It was while he was at Gusau that he was finally trapped on grains misappropriation charges, and deposed.<sup>xxxvi</sup>

Therefore, anti-corruption campaign in the colonial Sokoto emirate was considerably politicized, and that partly accounts for its failure, despite the serious disciplinary actions that were taken against some political office holders who were found guilty of corruption. Partly, for lack of sincerity, and most importantly because many corrupt public office holders could not be punished because of their connection and relations with the top colonial officials. The recent cases of Faruk Lawal vs Otedola; in 2014, Maina and pension scam; Stela Odua and bullet proof cars, Sanusi Lamido vs the NNPC, the charges of charter and maintenance of challenger 850 Aircraft worth 10 billion naira, by Allison Maduake; are few examples of unpunished proven charges of corruption, and, or victimization of perceived political threats. While the heads of NNPC, Ministries of Petroleum and Finance could neither be punished, nor suspended to find out the missing 20 billion US dollars oil revenues, the Central Bank of Nigeria Governor, Sanusi Lamido Sanusi have to be sacked for raising alarm. His sack was however said to be on alleged financial recklessness, extra-budgetary expenditure, and awarding contracts worth 48 and 5 billion naira to APC stalwarts respectively.<sup>xxxvii</sup> Simply for raising alarm that the said 20 billion US dollars were not remitted.

## Conclusion

Although cleansing the conquered territories from all forms of maladministration and corruption was theoretically among the motives of British colonization of Nigeria, the British anti-corruption campaign in colonial Sokoto emirate failed because the British officers were much more concerned with the accumulation of resources in league with native chiefs, than ensuring sanity in administration or protecting the welfare of the masses. They thus, sacrificed a lot of the welfare of the masses in the altar of ensuring a cordial relationship with the native Chiefs, which did assisted them in the attainment of the overall objective of colonial enterprise. i.e., the cooperation of the native Chiefs, both in executing their materially motivated policies, and mobilizing as much resources as possible, for expatriation to Britain. As long as tax generated revenue and other funds due to the crown were intact, haven known the financial condition the native chiefs were subjected, the British officers always turned a blind eye on extortion and maladministration by some native chiefs.

The British policy of zero tolerance on the misappropriation of the tax generated revenue was, on the other hand, exploited by the top N.A officials, and used it as a weapon to intimidate and silenced or eliminate some perceived political threat and opponents, within the local political establishment. The situation was that, having realized the fact that the British could be lenient on anything other than mishandling of the taxation revenue, the N.A used that as a weapon to either trap or push a particular official into tax embezzlement scandal, thus instigating the anger of the British colonial officers on the affected officer.

It has been identified in this article that lack of sincerity from the country's leadership, nepotism, godfatherism and overall politicization of issues of national interest, such as corruption, is one of the most serious problems undermining the progress and stability of Nigeria. The problem has actually started, or was indeed promoted during the colonial period. Unless the contemporary leadership is able to initiate genuine and sincere anti-

corruption policies, devoid of any selfish or political motive, the problem of corruption will continue to permeate the Social System.

Visionary and patriotic leadership as well as de-politicization of policies and programmes will undoubtedly assist the Nigeria's effort in eradicating, at least, public sector corruption in the country. It is the candid position of this article that as long as the top government officials continue to politicize the anti-corruption programs, like the way and manner graft agencies such as Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) and Independent Corruption Practices and other Related Offences Commission (ICPC) are sometimes abused, the problem of corruption will never be solved in Nigeria.

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- <sup>xxv</sup>. Ibid, Pp. 126-129.
- <sup>xxvi</sup>. Ibid, P. 127, Also Malam Abdullahi Magatakarda Sifawa, 93 years, oral interview on 2/6/2012.
- <sup>xxvii</sup>. Tibenderana, P.K, *Sokoto Province...* P. 130
- <sup>xxviii</sup>. Ibid, Pp. 131-132. See also: NAK, Sokprof, S. 2530, Sokoto Emirate Annual Report 1932, P. 21.
- <sup>xxix</sup>. Tibenderana, P.K., *Sokoto Province...*, 133-136.
- <sup>xxx</sup>. Padan J.N., *Ahadu Bello Sardauna of Sokoto: Values and Leadership in Nigeria*, Zaria, Huda-Huda Publishing Company, 1986, P. 111.
- <sup>xxxi</sup>. Ibid, P. 112. See also, NAK, SNP17, 32076A, Sokoto Province Annual Report 1939, P. 21, by Resident R.D. Ross. Alhaji Shehu Liman, Sifawa, 85 years, oral interview at Sifawa on 18/01/2013; and Alhaji Garba Gummi, Bursar, 87 years oral interview at Sokoto on 12/04/2014.
- <sup>xxxii</sup>. Ibid, Paden, Pp. 111-116.



<sup>xxxiii</sup>. J.N. Paden, *Ahmadu Bello Sardauna...*, PP. 112 – 117. See also: NAK, Sokprof, 793/rep.II, Famine Relied: Northern Province General Scheme for, prg. 229 – 230 and 235; NAK, SNP 17, 36700, Sokoto Province Annual Report 1943, prg. 48, by Resident H.B Leinard; and NAK, Sokprof, 6212, Annual Report Sokoto Province 1944, prg. 4, by Resident H.B. Leinard.

<sup>xxxiv</sup>. Ibid. PP. 118 – 119.

<sup>xxxv</sup>. Bello, A. Sardauan of Sokoto, *My life*, Zaria Gaskiya Corporation Limited, 1986, P. 58.

<sup>xxxvi</sup>. Alhaji Shehu Liman Sifawa, 85 years, oral interview on 05/04/2013.

<sup>xxxvii</sup>. *Vanguard Newspaper*, Saturday, 15<sup>th</sup> March, 2014. See also; *Vanguard Newspaper*, Monday, 17<sup>th</sup> March, 2014; *Vanguard Newspaper*, Thursday, 20<sup>th</sup> March, 2014; *Vanguard Newspaper*, Friday, 21<sup>st</sup> March, 2014; *Vanguard Newspaper*, Friday, 28<sup>th</sup> March, 2014; and *Daily Sun Newspaper*, Monday, 24<sup>th</sup> March, 2014.