Sustainability thoughts 131: How can the shift from normal liberal democracies to extreme liberal democracies be used to extract the democratic structure that leads to the rise of temporary and permanent authoritarianism from within?

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Abstract: It can be said that normal liberal democracies based on majority view rule or based on normal populism lead to normal democratic outcomes (NDO) under no complacency, one person one vote and everybody vote based systems. Normal liberal democracy thinking can be linked to political and legal loyalty to country/democracy/constitution as they are fundamental for normal democratic outcomes to persist when conflict arises in the democratic process between loyalty to country and loyalty to party. It can be said that extreme liberal democracies based on minority view rule or based on populism with a mask lead to extreme democratic outcomes (EDO) under effective targeted chaos or under full true majority complacency, in one person one vote and everybody vote based systems. Extreme liberal democracy thinking can be linked to political and legal loyalty to party/individual/movement as they are fundamental for extreme democratic outcome to persist when conflict arises in the democratic process between loyalty to party and loyalty to country.

The coming of Brexit and Trumpism has been seen since 2016 by normal liberal democracy oriented politicians as unfortunate outcomes in the UK and in the USA without apparently realising that these extreme democratic outcomes are in essence the seeds of antidemocratic or autocratic based forces that aimed in order to survive at undermining or dismantling the normal democratic model and value system inside which through effective targeted chaos they comes to exist. As the legal and political loyalty in extreme democratic outcomes is to the party/individual/movement, in the case of the USA, loyalty is to Trumpism; and the case of the UK, loyalty is to Brexism, then they go in direct conflict with normal democratic values such as independent rule of law and loyalty to country/democracy. For this reason as long as the exism movement persist or gains ground, even if the country/democracy as a whole loses as the result of implementing the movement policies, it is seen as a country win, be it social or economic losses. For example, the UK 2016-2020 as a whole ended up worse off at the end of BREXIT, but the 4 year break up is portrayed by hard core supporters as a country win or the USA 2016-2020 as a whole ended up worse off after 4 years of “Make America Great Again”, but policies benefiting the minority view/rich only are presented by hard core supporters as country wins.

Hence, extreme democratic outcomes are in essence, a temporary or permanent threat to the survival of the majority rule based liberal democracy inside which they comes to exist as once they exist their structure requires the undermining and/or dismantling of the normal liberal democracy structure and values through ongoing targeted chaos in order to ensure that in the long term they persist at all costs. Therefore, there is a need to understand and frame when extreme democratic outcomes are bound to be temporary or permanent once they come to exist. The discussion above makes the following questions very relevant: What is the structure of the paradigm shift from normal democratic outcomes (NDO) to extreme democratic outcomes (EDO)? What is the autocratic structure under which extreme democratic outcomes (EDO) need to operate in once they come to exist? What is the structure of temporary authoritarianism consistent with the shift short-term? What is the structure of permanent authoritarianism consistent with the shift long-term? What are the implications of the questions listed above when linked to the survival normal liberal democracies? Among the goals of this paper is to provide answers to the questions posed above.

Keywords: Normal democratic outcome, extreme democratic outcome, liberal democracy, normal liberal democracy, extreme liberal democracy, Brexism, Trumpism, no complacency, full true majority complacency, targeted chaos, effective targeted chaos, ineffective targeted chaos, true democracy, authoritarianism, temporary authoritarianism, permanent authoritarianism, normal populism, populism with a mask

Introduction
a) About the world of normal democratic outcomes (NDO)

It can be said that normal liberal democracies based on majority view rule or based on normal populism lead to normal democratic outcomes (NDO) under no complacency, one person one vote and everybody vote based systems, a structure summarized recently (Muñoz 2021) as indicated in Figure 1 below:

Figure 1 above tells us that normal democratic outcomes (NDO) come to exist when the liberal democracy operates under a voting system with no complacency (NC); and that to persist it needs the existence of an independent rule of law system (IRL) to back it up.

Normal liberal democracy (NLD) thinking can be linked to political and legal loyalty to country/democracy/constitution as they are fundamental for normal democratic outcomes to persist when conflict arises in the democratic process between loyalty to country and loyalty to party, a situation highlighted in Figure 2 below:

Figure 2 above let us see clearly that political and legal loyalty in the normal liberal democracy from the normal democratic outcome (NDO) and the courts (IRL) is to country/democracy/constitution, not to the NDO or party or movement. What matters here as that a normal democratic outcome (NDO) comes to exist and it has the political and legal loyalty it needs to persist at all costs.

b) About the world of extreme democratic outcomes (EDO)

It can be said that extreme liberal democracies based on minority view rule or based on populism with a mask lead to extreme democratic outcomes (EDO) under effective targeted chaos or under full true majority complacency, in one person one vote and everybody vote based systems, a structure shared recently (Muñoz 2021) as shown in Figure 3 below:
Figure 3 above tells us that extreme democratic outcomes (NDO) come to exist when liberal democracy operates under a voting system under effective targeted chaos (ETK) or under full true majority complacency (FTC); and that to persist it needs the existence of a non-independent rule of law system (NIRL) to back it up.

Extreme liberal democracy thinking can be linked to political and legal loyalty to party/individual/movement as they are fundamental for extreme democratic outcomes to persist when conflict arises in the democratic process between loyalty to party and loyalty to country, a situation pointed out in Figure 4 below:

Figure 4 above let us see clearly that political and legal loyalty in the extreme liberal democracy (ELD) from the extreme democratic outcome (EDO) and the non-independent courts (NIRL) is to party/individual/movement, not to the country or democracy or constitution. What matters here as that an extreme democratic outcome (EDO) comes to exist and it has the political and legal loyalty it needs to persist at all costs?

c) The 2016 shift from normal to extreme democratic outcome in liberal democracies such as in the UK with Brexit and in the USA with Trumpism

The coming of Brexism (BBC 2016) and Trumpism (Rawlinson 2016; TG 2016) has been seen since 2016 by normal liberal democracy oriented politicians simply as unexpected outcomes without apparently realising that these extreme democratic outcomes are in essence the seeds of antidemocratic or autocratic based forces, which are aimed at undermining or dismantling the normal democratic norms and value system inside which they come to exist; and this is done in order to maintain effective targeted chaos ongoing (Muñoz 2021) so as to win elections or done to facilitate their persistence at all cost in case of re-election loss through filing non-factual claims of electoral fraud in lower courts (Shamsian and Sheth 2021) and the supreme court (CBC 2020a) or demanding political loyalty (Solender 2020; Yourish et al 2021) or through force if needed (Wamsley 2021) as the case of Trumpism has shown. It has been highlighted in the past few years that under true majority complacency (Muñoz 2017a) democratic outcomes can be flipped outside down (Muñoz 2017b) bringing them away from traditional liberal democracy thinking and expectations (Muñoz 2015), a process consistent with specific complacency expectations rules (Muñoz 2018) that can be manipulated through targeted chaos (Muñoz 2019a) to produce extreme democratic outcomes like Trumpism, which needs to go immediately after coming to exist into war with normal liberal democracy values and institutions (Muñoz 2019b). As the legal and political loyalty in extreme democratic outcomes is to the party/individual/movement, in the case of the USA, loyalty is to Trumpism; and the case of the UK, loyalty is to Brexism, then they go in direct conflict as soon as they come to exist with normal
democratic values such as independent rule of law and loyalty to country/democracy/constitution. Hence, exism movements will require political and legal loyalty and protection from the system; and those who do not provide that are enemies of the movement. For example, Trumpism treated those not providing expected loyalty as enemies to be fired (Shear and Apuzzo 2017; Miller 2018) or demonized (Diamond 2016; Wemple 2020); and those providing protection as loyal people (Herb 2020). For this reason as long as the exism movement persist or gains ground, even if the country/democracy as a whole loses as the result of implementing the exism movement policies, it is seen as a country win, be it social or economic losses. For example, the UK 2016-2020 as a whole ended up worse off at the end of BREXIT, but the 4 year break up is portrayed by hard core supporters as a country win (CBC 2020b) or the USA 2016-2020 as a whole ended up worse off after 4 years of “Make America Great Again”, but policies benefiting the minority view/rich such as tax cuts to the rich and packing the judiciary (Haltiwanger 2021) or bail outs to farmers (Charles 2019) are presented by hard core supporters as country wins despite damage to normal democratic norms and institutions by pushing social, economic, environmental and health action towards division or polarization.

d) The need to understand when extreme democratic outcomes are bound to be temporary or permanent

Hence, extreme democratic outcomes are in essence, a temporary or permanent threat to the survival of the majority rule based liberal democracy inside which they come to exist as once they exist their structure requires the undermining and/or dismantling of the normal liberal democracy structure and values through ongoing targeted chaos in order to ensure that in the long term they persist at all costs. Therefore, there is a need to understand and frame when extreme democratic outcomes are bound to be temporary or permanent once they come to exist. The discussion above makes the following questions very relevant: What is the structure of the paradigm shift from normal democratic outcomes (NDO) to extreme democratic outcomes (EDO)? What is the autocratic structure under which extreme democratic outcomes (EDO) need to operate in once they come to exist? What is the structure of temporary authoritarianism consistent with the shift short-term? What is the structure of permanent authoritarianism consistent with the shift long-term? What are the implications of the questions listed above for the survival normal liberal democracy?. Among the goals of this paper is to provide answers to the questions posed above.

The goals of this paper

i) To highlight the structure of the paradigm shift from normal liberal democracy to extreme liberal democracy; ii) To link the structure of the shift to the expected autocratic behavior of the extreme democratic outcome once it comes to exist; iii) To link the structure of the shift to temporary authoritarianism; iv) To link the structure of the shift to permanent authoritarianism; and v) To stress the main implications the coming of extreme democratic outcomes to the survival of normal liberal democracies.

Methodology

i) The terminology used in this article is shared; ii) Operational concepts, chaos expectations, operational models and complacency expectations are given; iii) The structure of the paradigm shift from normal democratic outcomes (NDO) to extreme democratic outcomes (EDO) is highlighted; iv) The autocratic structure under which extreme democratic outcomes (EDO) need to operate in once they come to exist is stressed; v) The structure of temporary authoritarianism consistent with the shift short-term is pointed out; vi) The structure of permanent authoritarianism consistent with the shift long-term is provided; vii) A short summary and relevant implications to the survival of normal liberal democracies are provided; and viii) Some food for thoughts and relevant conclusions are listed.

Terminology

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Symbol</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tr>
<td>V</td>
<td>Voting model</td>
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<tr>
<td>G1</td>
<td>Group of voters 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G2</td>
<td>Group of voters 2</td>
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<tr>
<td>T</td>
<td>True majority</td>
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<td>M</td>
<td>true minority</td>
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<td>D</td>
<td>Democracy</td>
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<td>K</td>
<td>General chaos</td>
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<td>Outcome</td>
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V = Voting model
G1 = Group of voters 1
G2 = Group of voters 2
T = True majority
M = true minority
D = Democracy
TD = True democracy
A = Group A
B = Group B
K = General chaos
O = Outcome
Operational concepts, chaos expectations, operational models and complacency expectations

A) Operational concepts

1) Democracy, system that aims at providing equal opportunity to elect, to be represented, and to share in the benefits to all its members;
2) True democracy, there is equal opportunity in all democratic aspects as the same time;
3) Partially distorted democracy, there is not equal opportunity in at least one democratic aspect;
4) Fully distorted democracy, there is inequality of opportunity in all democratic aspects at the same time;
5) Majority rule system, the electoral system where the majority rules decides the winner of democratic contexts;
6) Voters, each individual in the electoral system acting without complacency and who is committed to make sure his vote or her vote is counted in the determination of the democratic outcome with the goal to maintain or improve his current or future benefits and rights;
7) True majority, the actual number of voters who win the democratic context;
8) True minority, the actual number of voters who lose the democratic context;
9) Complacency, the social discontent or protest or frustration affecting opposing groups with the given democratic or electoral system choices that may lead voters from the true majority and/or the true minority to not vote at all or if they vote they go for a protest vote by either voiding their vote or shifting their vote to other choices in the belief that their party will still win or will still lose anyway without their vote or in the belief that their vote is just one vote anyway and it will not matter in the end result; Hence, complacency based voting is linked to pure dissatisfaction as voting behavior takes place without thinking much about the impact that this action may have in the end on the balance of current and future majority and minority democratic rights;
10) No complacency, the absence of social discontent or protest or frustration with the democratic or electoral system that leads each voter from each group to vote for their preferred democratic choice to ensure his or her vote is counted, therefore no complacency based voting is linked either to ensuring the preservation and enhancing of current democratic rights in one group or linked to seeking the erosion or change of those rights or to slowing the pace of democratic change in the other group;
11) Partial complacency, the partial social discontent or protest or frustration with the democratic or electoral choices is not widespread; some voters do not vote or cast a protest vote;
12) Full complacency, the general social discontent or protest or frustration with the democratic or electoral choices is widespread; many voters do not vote or cast a protest vote;
13) True majority complacency, it can be partial or full, voters do not show to vote or spoil the vote or shift votes in a show of social discontent or protest or frustration;
14) True minority complacency, it can be partial or full, voters do not show to vote or spoil the vote or shift votes in a show of social discontent or protest or frustration;
15) True majority no complacency, everybody in the true majority camp votes for their preferred candidate, no protest votes take place;

16) True minority no complacency, everybody in the true minority camp votes for their preferred candidate, no protest votes take place;

17) Normal democratic outcome, under no complacency or not protest behavior everybody votes and the true majority wins the democratic contest; governments retain or lose power without big surprises. Inclusion, openness, respect for the rule of law, equality, stability, integration, union, harmony, the truth, trust, clarity, scientific facts, and the will of the majority for the common good are the heart of normal democratic outcomes.

18) Extreme democratic outcome, under full true majority complacency or full true majority protest behavior the true minority wins the democratic contest, governments lose or win power under a big surprise as the democratic option that seems impossible to happen wins the day. Exclusion, closetedness, lack of respect for the rule of law, inequality, instability, separation, division, chaos, fake truth, fake trust, confusion, fake facts, and the will of the minority for the good of the minority are the heart of extreme democratic outcomes.

19) Internal complacency, social discontent or protest or frustration generated by internal group divisions (e.g. divisive choice/leaders);

20) External complacency, social discontent or protest or frustration generated by external group divisions (e.g. equally disliked competing choices/leaders);

21) Full democracy, a full inclusion model, a true democracy;

22) Partial democracy, a partial inclusion model, a distorted democracy;

23) Democratic stability, the tendency towards harmony associated with specific democratic outcomes;

24) Full democratic stability, the tendency towards full harmony associated with normal democratic outcomes;

25) Full democratic instability, the tendency towards zero harmony associated with extreme democratic outcomes.

26) BREXIT, the extreme democratic outcome supporting the UK withdrawing from the European Union.

27) BREXISM, the extreme democratic movements supporting the breakup of economic or territorial or state based unions.

28) USEXIT, the extreme democratic outcome supporting the USA withdrawing from the international and local order.

29) USEXISM, the extreme democratic movements supporting the breakup of the international and local order.

30) EXISM, the extreme democratic movements aiming at destroying majority rule based institutions, locally and globally.

31) Democratic normalism, the tendency of normal democratic outcomes to move towards more stable or balanced democratic conditions through time as they seek responsible majority rule.

32) Democratic extremism, the tendency of extreme democratic outcomes to move towards the more unstable or unequal democratic conditions as they flourish under irresponsible minority rule.

33) Effective targeted chaos, the chaos that leads to full true majority complacency or achieves specific targets.

34) Ineffective targeted chaos, the chaos that does not lead to full true majority complacency or does not achieve specific targets.

35) Normal liberal democracy, the one where the majority view wins the democratic contest.

36) Extreme liberal democracy, the one where the minority view wins the democratic contest.

37) Effective targeted chaos, the one that leads to full true majority complacency.

38) Ineffective targeted chaos, the one that does not lead to full true majority complacency.

39) Normal populism, when the majority view wins the democratic contest, the common good is the target.

40) Populism with a mask, when the minority view wins the democratic contest, the private good is the target.

B) Chaos expectations

If we have a population of voters (V) that can be divided into two groups, groups A and group B under the assumption of one person, one vote; and the assumption that everybody votes so that the total number of voters equals the total number of votes, then the voting model can be expressed as follows:

1) \[ V = AB \]

Formula 1 simply says that the voting system (V) brings together two groups of voters, group A and group B. If we assume we do not know the size of group A and the size of group B, then the expectation of who will win the voting contest is not clear. In other words, when you do not know the size of the groups involved in the voting contest the expected winner outcome (O) is not clear (?), a situation that can be expressed as follows:

2) \[ V = AB \rightarrow O = \text{winner A or B} = ? \]

In formula 2 we can see that the expected outcome (O) of who is the winner is not clear (?) as we do not know the size of each group.
Now we can use formula 2 to create a general influence operation where the influence on the working of the voting model \((V)\) comes from factor \(I\), which systematically affects the voting system; and it therefore may affect the nature of the outcome \((O)\) as indicated below:

3) \[I[V] = I[AB] \rightarrow I[O = \text{winner A or B} = ?]\]

Formula 3 shows that the working and the outcome of the voting process \((V)\) is being affected systematically by the operator \(I\).

a) General chaos expectations when we do not know the size of the groups involved

If we make the influence operator \((I)\) be general chaos \((K)\), then we have \(I = K\) and if we substitute this in formula 3 we can state the expected influence of general chaos \((K)\) on the winner expectation when we do not know the size of group \(A\) and of group \(B\).

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<th>Expectation 1</th>
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When the voting system \((V)\) is under the influence of general chaos \((K)\), we cannot link chaos and winners as we do not know the size of the groups involved and there is no clear targeting, which can be stated as:

4) \[K[V] = K[AB] \rightarrow K[O = \text{winner A or B} = ?] = ?\]

Notice that if there is no chaos, \(K = I = 1\), still we would not be able to have a clear expectation of the winner, an expectation consistent with that of formula 2 above.

b) Targeted chaos expectations under majority rule

If we assume now the size of group \(A\) is greater than that of group \(B\) in the voting model \((V)\) so that \(A > B\), where \(A\) is the majority group and \(B\) is the minority group, then the majority rule expectation leads to an outcome \((O)\) that is normal democratic outcome \((NDO)\) where the majority group \(A\) wins the voting contest, as indicated below:

5) \[V = AB \rightarrow O = \text{winner A}\]

In formula 5 we can see that the expected outcome \((O)\) is clear, group \(A\) is the winner as we do know that \(A > B\). Now we can use formula 5 to create a general influence operation where the influence on the working of the majority rule voting model \((V)\) comes from factor \(I\), which systematically affects the voting system and it therefore may affect the nature of the majority rule based outcome \((O)\) as indicated below:

6) \[I[V] = I[AB] \rightarrow I[O = \text{winner A}]\]

Formula 6 tells us that the working and the outcome of the majority rule voting process \((V)\) is being affected by the operator \(I\).

If we make the influence operator \(I\) be targeted chaos \(TK_i\), so that \(I = TK_i\), then the targeted chaos influence operation can be stated as follows:

7) \[TK[V] = TK[AB] \rightarrow TK[O = \text{winner A}]\]

Notice from expression 7 above that depending of the type of targeted chaos \((TK_i)\), the nature of the majority rule winner may change, and it raises the possibility that under a specific type of successful targeting the outcome can be flipped and be won by group \(B\), a situation consistent with the ideas shared in the introduction that a specific type of targeted chaos may lead to flipping the majority rule based democratic outcome.

i) The case of chaos targeted to induce the collapse of the minority group vote \((TK_0)\)
Expectation 2

When majority rule voting system (V) is under minority group targeted chaos (TK_B), therefore, I = TK = TK_B, then the majority group A still wins the voting contest, and with a bigger majority as this chaos leads to minority vote collapse, partial or full, which flips minority votes toward the majority view camp:


Notice that chaos targeted to the minority group TK_B does not affect group A.

Expectation 3

When minority group targeted chaos leads to partial minority collapse (TK_PB) so that I = TK = TK_PB, then the majority group A still wins, with a slightly bigger majority,


Expectation 4

When minority group targeted chaos leads to full minority collapse (TK_FB) so that I = TK = TK_FB, the majority group A still wins, with the biggest majority,


Notice that expectations 2, 3 and 4 above tell us that when the majority rules voting system (V) is under any type of minority group targeted chaos, the majority group is still expected to win the voting contest.

ii) The case of chaos targeted to induce the collapse of the majority group vote (TK_A)

Expectation 5

When the majority rule voting system (V) is under majority group targeted chaos (TK_A), so that I = TK = TK_A we cannot have a clear expectation of the voting outcome (O) or of who the winner is expected to be without knowing the type of true majority targeting and therefore, the type of majority group collapse it generates, partially majority group collapse (TK_PA) or full majority group collapse (TK_FA), as indicated below:


Notice that chaos targeted to the majority group TK_A does not affect group B.

Expectation 6

When majority group targeted chaos (TK_A) leads to partial majority collapse (TK_PA) so that I = TK = TK_PA, then the majority group A still wins the voting contest as still A > B, with a smaller majority, as stated below:

12) TK_PA[V] = TK_PA[AB] \rightarrow TK_PA[O = winner A] = A wins, smaller majority

Expectation 7

When majority group targeted chaos (TK_A) leads to full majority collapse (TK_FA) so that I = TK = TK_FA, the minority group B wins the voting contest as now B > A, since the majority group A votes has fully collapsed as shown below:


This is the only instance when an expected normal democratic outcome A can be flipped to an extreme
C) Operational models

a) The general voting model

If we have a one person, one vote system, then we can express the population of voters \( V_p \) as follows:

\[
V_p = V_1 + V_2 + V_3 + \ldots + V_{100} + V_{101} + \ldots + V_n
\]

Model \( V_p \) in expression 14) above gathers all voters from voter \( V_1 \) to voter \( V_n \), which can also be stated as indicated below:

\[
V_p = \sum_{i=1}^{n} V_i
\]

Therefore, formula 15) above indicates the summation of all voters.

b) The general voting model by groupings

We can also express the population of voters in formula 14) and 15) in two main groups or views, group \( G_1 \) and group \( G_2 \) as shown below:

\[
G_1 = V_1 + V_2 + \ldots + V_{100} = \sum_{j=1}^{r} V_j \quad \text{and} \quad G_2 = V_{101} + \ldots + V_n = \sum_{k=1}^{s} V_k, \text{ where } r + s = n
\]

Therefore, the voting model by groups can now be indicated as follows:

\[
V_p = G_1 + G_2
\]

In the model \( V_p \) in expression 17) above we can see that the views of both groups \( G_1 \) and \( G_2 \) matter to determine the democratic outcome of the voting system. If the views of one group were not present, the voting system would be bias.

c) The general voting model in terms of true minority and true majority

If we assume that group \( G_2 > G_1 \), then \( G_2 \) is the true majority (T) and \( G_1 \) is the true minority (M) so that \( G_1 = M \) and \( G_2 = T \); and therefore, the following is true:

\[
V_p = M + T
\]

In the model \( V_p \) in expression 18) above we can see that the views of both groups \( M \) and \( T \) matter to determine the democratic outcome of the voting system. If the views of one group were not present, the voting system would be bias.

d) The fully inclusive general voting model

The voting model \( V \) that brings together the competing views of groups of participants is the ideal voting model as it is fully inclusive as indicated below:

\[
V = G_2.G_1 = T.M
\]

Model \( V \) in expression 19) above tells us that the views of \( G_2 \) and \( G_1 \) and the views of the true majority \( T \) and the true minority \( M \) are present in the model at the same time; and therefore it is fully inclusive.

e) Effective and ineffective targeted chaos

\[
ETK = TKFTC
\]
Expression 20 simply tells us that chaos that leads to full true majority complacency TKFTC is effective chaos ETK, which leads to an extreme democratic outcome win or to a normal democratic outcome loss.

21) ITK = N[TKFTC]

Expression 21 says that chaos that does not lead to full true majority complacency N[TKFTC] is ineffective chaos ITK, which leads to an extreme democratic outcome loss or to a normal democratic outcome win.

f) Complacency expectations and expected democratic outcomes

If NC = no complacency                               FTC = Full true majority complacency
FMC = Full true minority complacency      PTC = Partial true majority complacency
PMC = Partial true minority complacency      D = V = T.M = democratic contest

Then the following expectations hold true:

22) NC[D] = NC[V] = NC[T.M]----→ T wins as T > M = NDO

Expression 22 says that under no complacency (NC) we should expect the voting system (V) to produce a normal democratic outcome (NDO).

23) FTC[D] = FTC[V] = FTC[T].M----→ M wins at T < M = EDO

Expression 23 says that under full true majority complacency (FTC) we should expect the voting system (V) to produce an extreme democratic outcome (EDO).

24) FMC[D] = FMC[V] = T.FMC[M]----→ T wins as T > M = NDO

Expression 24 says that under full true minority complacency (FMC) we should expect the voting system (V) to produce a normal democratic outcome (NDO).

25) PTC[D] = PTC[V] = PTC[T].M----→ T wins as T > M = NDO

Expression 25 says that under partial true majority complacency (PTC) we should expect the voting system (V) to produce a normal democratic outcome (NDO).


Expression 26 says that under partial true minority complacency (PMC) we should expect the voting system (V) to produce a normal democratic outcome (NDO).

The structure of the paradigm shift from normal democratic outcomes (NDO) to extreme democratic outcomes (EDO)

Consistent with complacency expectations, when the liberal democracy voting system is under effective targeted chaos (EFK), chaos targeted to induce full true majority complacency (FTC), then a shift from normal liberal democracies or democratic outcome shown in Figure 2 to extreme liberal democracy or democratic outcome shown in Figure 4 takes place, a situation summarized in Figure 5 below:
We can appreciate the following based on Figure 5 above: i) the normal democratic outcome (NDO) under effective targeted chaos (ETK) shift to an extreme democratic outcome (EDO); and ii) hence, the extreme democratic outcome (EDO) structure is inconsistent with the normal liberal democracy and its political and legal structure within which it came to exist. Notice that political and legal loyalty and the independent rule of law (IRL) do not change when extreme democratic outcomes (EDO) come to power from within as indicated by the broken black arrows from political and legal loyalty to country box to the political and legal loyalty to party box and from IRL to NIRL, which represent major challenges to the implementation of the extreme democratic outcome plans if they come in conflict with loyalty to country or with the independent rule of law.

**The autocratic structure under which extreme democratic outcomes (EDO) need to operate in once they come to exist**

Hence, to implement policy and to ensure it persist the extreme democratic outcome (EDO) must be expected to follow an ongoing and systematic targeted chaos campaigns from the beginning aimed at undermining normal liberal democracy values (NLD), at undermining political and legal loyalty to competing normal democratic outcomes (NDO) on the waiting, and undermining the independent working of the rule of law (IRL) all at the same time, with the hope of keeping effective targeted chaos active permanently, a situation detailed in Figure 6 below:
Figure 6 above indicates that as soon as it comes to exist, the extreme democratic outcome (EDO) will engage in autocratic behavior targeted to undermining, and if possible, corrupting, the normal liberal democracy (NLD) and its values as well as its independent rule of law system (IRL) as indicated by the yellow arrows from EDO to NLD and to IRL, with the overall goal of slowly flipping legal loyalty to country/democracy/constitution to legal loyalty party/individual/movement to ensure its survival, whether it wins or loses elections.

The structure of temporary authoritarianism consistent with the shift short-term

When re-elections take place and the extreme democratic outcome has not succeeded in corrupting the independent rule of law system (IRL) and the political and legal loyalty to country/constitution/democracy yet, it loses the election it cannot persist. In other words, if re-election takes place under an independent rule of law and under political and legal loyalty to country/democracy and it loses the election, then the extreme democratic outcome cannot persist, and normal liberal democracy and democratic outcome rules is restored and this is because if the extreme democratic outcome claims election fraud when it is not it will not succeed in independent courts (IRL) and it will not succeed in political court in political bodies, leading to temporary authoritarianism. In other words, the day the extreme democratic outcomes lose an election under the independent rule of law and political and legal loyalty to country, it will not persist and normal liberal democracy will be restored, a situation reflecting in Figure 7 below:
Figure 7 above reflects the structure of temporary authoritarianism that results when extreme democratic outcomes are still operating under independent rule of law and legal and political loyalty to country, it wins when it wins and it loses when it loses. Hence, Figure 7 above can help us see the following: i) If the extreme democratic outcome (EDO) wins re-election the independent rule of law (IRL) system will validate the election win as the normal democratic outcome (NDO) has no evidence to bring a challenge to its loss in an independent court; the extreme democratic outcome persists; and ii) If the extreme democratic outcome (EDO) loses re-election the independent rule of law (IRL) system and the political and legal loyalty system will validate the election loss as indicated by the broken green arrow from IRL to EDO as the extreme democratic outcome (EDO) has no evidence to bring a challenge to its loss in an independent court, and if it files a challenge without facts and proof it will lose: the extreme democratic outcome fails to persist and normal liberal democracy is restored.

The structure of permanent authoritarianism consistent with the shift long-term

When re-elections take place and the extreme democratic outcome has succeeded in corrupting the independent rule of law system (IRL) and the political and legal loyalty to country/constitution/democracy fully, then if it loses the election it can persist still. In other words, if re-election takes place under a non-independent rule of law and under political and legal loyalty to party/individual/movement and it still wins the election, then the extreme democratic outcome comes to persist, whether it wins or loses elections, and then the world of normal liberal democracy and democratic outcomes is lost; and this is because if the normal democratic outcome wins and it claims election fraud it will not succeed in non-independent courts (NIRL) and it will not succeed in non-independent political court in political bodies as they are not interested in facts and proof, but loyalty to the movement, leading to permanent authoritarianism. In other words, the day the extreme democratic outcomes manage to corrupt the independent rule of law and the political and legal loyalty values, it will persist permanently and normal liberal democracy will be extinguished, a situation highlighted in Figure 8 below:
Figure 8 above indicates the structure of permanent authoritarianism that results when extreme democratic outcomes (EDO) operate under non-independent rule of law and legal and political loyalty to movement; it wins all the time, even when it loses the election. Hence, Figure 8 above can help us see the following: i) If the extreme democratic outcome (EDO) wins re-election the non-independent rule of law (NIRL) system will validate the election win as the normal democratic outcome (NDO) has no evidence to bring a challenge to its loss to a non-independent court: the extreme democratic outcome persists; and ii) If the extreme democratic outcome (EDO) loses re-election the non-independent rule of law (NIRL) system and the political and legal loyalty to movement system will validate the election loss as win as indicated by the broken green arrow from NIRL to NDO as even thought the extreme democratic outcome (EDO) has evidence to bring a challenge to its loss in a non-independent court, and if it files a challenge with facts and proof it will still lose as the truth in non-independent courts do not matter, legal loyalty to movement matters: the extreme democratic outcome persists at all costs and normal liberal democracy rule disappears.

Summary:

Effective targeted chaos leads to a shift from normal liberal democracy to extreme liberal democracy. The democratic outcome shifts from normal democratic outcome to extreme democratic outcome, leading to an extreme democratic outcome having to operate inside a system where the independent rule of law and where the legal and political loyalty is to country democracy. This situation leads to extreme democratic outcomes having to behave in an autocratic fashion from the beginning, both to implement its policies and to create the ongoing chaos conditions needed to persist when the time for re-election comes. When the re-election of the extreme democratic outcomes comes when the independent rule of law and loyalty to country value systems have not yet been corrupted, then we have the conditions for temporary Authoritarianism as sooner or later the extreme democratic outcome will lose an election and then it will fail to persist. When re-election of the extreme democratic outcome comes when the independent rule of law and the political and legal loyalty to country value systems have been fully corrupted then we have the conditions for permanent authoritarianism as then where winning or losing elections the extreme democratic outcome still persists. Hence, temporary authoritarianism and permanent authoritarianism as a temporary and a permanent threat, respectively, to the survival of normal liberal democracies.
Implications:

The discussion above has the following implications for the survival normal liberal democracy: i) The coming of extreme liberal democratic outcomes bought a real threat to the survival of normal liberal democracies and their working as we know them as extreme democratic outcomes have no choice but to behave autocratically from the beginning; ii) The threat posed by temporary authoritarianism remains temporary for as long as the independent rule of law value system and the political and legal loyalty to country value system remain uncorrupted; iii) The threat posed by permanent authoritarianism is permanent as soon as the independent rule of law value system and the political and legal loyalty to democracy value system have been fully corrupted and transformed into a non-independent legal system with legal and political loyalty to the authoritarian movement; and iv) If during the period of temporary authoritarianism normal democratic values and institutions are fully corrupted, that means the end of normal liberal democracies and of normal democratic outcomes as then the minority view will permanently rule and there is not a democratic way back.

Food for thoughts

1) Can extreme democratic outcomes under majority rule based election systems exist under no complacency? I think no, what do you think?; 2) Are exism movements like Brexism and Trumpism based on normal populism? I think no, what do you think?; 3) Are normal democratic outcomes like 2020 Biden win over Trumpism based on populism with a mask? I think no, what do you think?; and 4) Does permanent authoritarianism, from within or from outside, democratic values, has the same type of rule of law value system and of political and legal loyalty system structure to ensure their survival at all costs? I think yes, what do you think?

Conclusions

i) It was pointed out that when there is effective targeted chaos the election process leads to an extreme democratic outcome flipping the system from a normal liberal democracy to an extreme liberal democracy; ii) It was highlighted extreme liberal democracies have to operate autocratically from the beginning as their values, morality, legal structure, and their political and legal loyalty system are the opposite as those of normal liberal democracies; iii) It was stressed that as long as the independent rule of law system and the legal and political loyalty to country/democracy system are not corrupted after the extreme democratic outcome comes to exist, then there will be a period of temporary authoritarianism that will end as soon as the extreme democratic outcome loses the first re-election; iv) It was indicated that as soon as the independent rule of law system and the legal and political loyalty to country/democracy system are fully corrupted the extreme democratic outcome will persist, even when it loses elections, and then there will be a period of permanent authoritarianism with the end of normal liberal democracy as we know it as even if the normal democratic outcome wins the elections if will lose if trying to validate the election win in non-independent legal court systems, where loyalty to the extreme democratic movements is the rule; and v) In general, it was shown that the coming of extreme democratic outcomes brings real risk to the survival of normal liberal democracies, a temporary real risk in the form of temporary authoritarianism as there is a chance of democracy being restored as soon as the extreme democratic outcome loses the first re-election; and a permanent real risk in the form of permanent authoritarianism where there is no chance of democracy being restored as the extreme democratic outcome always wins, leading in this case to end of liberal democracy rule or the death of normal democracies.

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